Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Geir B. Asheim
Author-X-Name-First: Geir B.
Author-X-Name-Last: Asheim
Author-Email: g.b.asheim@econ.uio.no
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, Norway
Author-Name: Kuntal Banerjee
Author-X-Name-First: Kuntal 
Author-X-Name-Last: Banerjee
Author-Email: kbanerje@fau.edu
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University
Title: Fixed-step anonymous overtaking and catching-up
Abstract: We investigate criteria for evaluating infinite utility streams that satisfy Fixed-step anonymity and includes some notion of overtaking or catching-up. We do so in a generalized setting which do not require us to specify the underlying finite-dimensional criterion (e.g., utilitarianism or leximin). We present axiomatizations that rely on weaker axioms than those in the literature, and which in one case is new. We also provide a complete analysis of the relationships between the symmetric parts of these criteria and likewise for the asymmetric parts. 
Length: 25 pages
Creation-Date: 2009-01
Revision-Date:
Publication-Status: 
File-URL: http://kuntal.banerjee.googlepages.com/fsa01.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf 
File-Function: First version, 2009
Number: 09001
Classification-JEL: D63, D71
Keywords: Intergenerational justice; Utilitarianism; Leximin
Handle: RePEc:fal:wpaper:09001


Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Kuntal Banerjee
Author-X-Name-First: Kuntal 
Author-X-Name-Last: Banerjee
Author-Email: kbanerje@fau.edu
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University
Author-Name: Tapan Mitra
Author-X-Name-First: Tapan
Author-X-Name-Last: Mitra
Author-Email: tm19@cornell.edu
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Cornell University
Title: Equivalence of Utilitarian Maximal and Weakly Maximal Programs
Abstract: For a class of aggregative optimal growth models, which allow for a non-convex and non-differentiable production technology, this paper examines whether the set of utilitarian maximal programs coincides with the set of weakly maximal programs. It identifies a condition, called the Phelps-Koopmans condition, under which the equivalence result holds. An example is provided to demonstrate that the equivalence result is invalid when the Phelps-Koopmans condition does not hold.
Length: 24 pages
Creation-Date: 2009-02
Revision-Date:
Publication-Status: 
File-URL: http://kuntal.banerjee.googlepages.com/Equivalence1Feb2009.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf 
File-Function: First version, 2009
Number: 09002
Classification-JEL: C61, D90, E10, O41
Keywords: Utilitarian Maximal; Weakly Maximal; Phelps-Koopmans condition; Aggregative growth models
Handle: RePEc:fal:wpaper:09002


Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Eric Van Tassel
Author-X-Name-First: Eric
Author-X-Name-Last: Van Tassel
Author-Email: vantasse@fau.edu
Title: Moral Hazard and Capital Requirements in a Lending Model of Credit Denial
Abstract: In this paper we analyze a repeated game in which an intermediary offers unsecured loans to entrepreneurs using future credit denial to induce repayment. To finance the loans, the intermediary uses a combination of equity capital and external funds. We focus on a moral hazard problem that emerges between the intermediary and the less informed external investors over a costly loan monitoring choice. The presence of informed borrowers in the lender’s portfolio turns out to act as a substitute for capital requirements. The result is that the lending strategy utilized by the intermediary minimizes the moral hazard problem but implies the intermediary’s balance sheet is fragile to exogenous risk.
Length: 32 pages
Creation-Date: 2009-05
Revision-Date:
Publication-Status: 
File-URL: http://home.fau.edu/vantasse/web/BankMHRisk.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf 
File-Function: First version, 2009
Number: 09003
Classification-JEL: G21, G28, O16
Keywords: Moral hazard; Capital requirements; Bank regulation; Repayment incentives
Handle: RePEc:fal:wpaper:09003


Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Eric Van Tassel
Author-X-Name-First: Eric
Author-X-Name-Last: Van Tassel
Author-Email: vantasse@fau.edu
Title: Sharing credit information under endogenous costs
Abstract: In this paper we study a model in which asymmetrically informed banks compete with one another to offer loans to entrepreneurs with risky projects. Banks are given an opportunity to share private credit information about their borrowers. The revealed information impacts both the bank’s repayment revenue as well as its costs, in terms of either the rate paid on debt and insurance, or the risk adjusted capital requirement. In this framework, we study how the interaction of repayment revenue and cost shape individual banks’ incentives to share information and in turn, how this explains the overall degree of information sharing in the economy.
Length: 23 pages
Creation-Date: 2009-06
Revision-Date:
Publication-Status: 
File-URL: http://home.fau.edu/vantasse/web/SharingCreditInf.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf 
File-Function: First version, 2009
Number: 09004
Classification-JEL: D82, G21, O16
Keywords: Information sharing; Bank competition; Market discipline
Handle: RePEc:fal:wpaper:09004