Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Vidhi Chhaochharia Author-X-Name-First: Vidhi Author-X-Name-Last: Chhaochharia Author-Email: vchhaochharia@exchange.sba.miami.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Finance, School of Business, University of Miami Author-Name: Suman Ghosh Author-X-Name-First: Suman Author-X-Name-Last: Ghosh Author-Email: sghosh@fau.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University Title: Do Charity Ratings Matter? Abstract: This paper investigates whether donor contributions to charities responds to the information incorporated in charity ratings. Using charity ratings data from 1999-2004, we find that ratings do have a significant effect on contributions received. We find that charities that have the lowest rating have 16 % less contributions as compared to charities with the highest rating. In addition we find that charities in turn react to lower ratings by increasing their fundraising expenditures. Our results suggest that ratings do have an effect in reducing the asymmetry of information that exists amongst donors and the charities. Length: 24 pages Creation-Date: 2008-02 Revision-Date: Publication-Status: File-URL: http://home.fau.edu/sghosh/web/CharityFeb19.pdf File-Format: Application/pdf File-Function: First version, 2008 Number: 08001 Classification-JEL: Keywords: Handle: RePEc:fal:wpaper:08001 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Suman Ghosh Author-X-Name-First: Suman Author-X-Name-Last: Ghosh Author-Email: sghosh@fau.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University Author-Name: Alexander Karaivanov Author-X-Name-First: Alexander Author-X-Name-Last: Karaivanov Author-Email: akaraiva@sfu.ca Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University Title: Altruism in the Principal-Agent Model: The Samaritan’s Dilemma Revisited Abstract: We study the Samaritan’s Dilemma problem in a context where a transfer from an altruist to an agent has a bearing on the agent’s contractual relationship with a third party (a principal). We show that the terms of the principal-agent contract are affected by the presence of the altruist and can change in a way so that the inefficiency result in the standard Samaritan’s Dilemma problem is mitigated or completely avoided. Length: 11 pages Creation-Date: 2008-02 Revision-Date: Publication-Status: File-URL: http://home.fau.edu/sghosh/web/samsdilemmafeb19[1].pdf File-Format: Application/pdf File-Function: First version, 2008 Number: 08002 Classification-JEL: D64, D82 Keywords: the Samaritan’s Dilemma, moral hazard, altruism Handle: RePEc:fal:wpaper:08002 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Suman Ghosh Author-X-Name-First: Suman Author-X-Name-Last: Ghosh Author-Email: sghosh@fau.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University Author-Name: Eric Van Tassel Author-X-Name-First: Eric Author-X-Name-Last: Van Tassel Author-Email: vantasse@fau.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University Title: A Model of Mission Drift in Microfinance Institutions Abstract: In this paper we offer a theoretical examination of the phenomenon known as mission drift. In recent years there have been claims that the entry of large donors with deep pockets have led to a mission drift phenomenon, whereby microfinance institutions who were previously catering to the poorest agents have drifted towards catering to the less poor. We offer an explanation for how the change in the lending portfolio of a poverty minimizing microfinance institution might be linked to the phenomenon of increasing commercialization through the advent of these large profit oriented donors. The degree to which lending portfolios change turns out to be a function of both the supply of donor funds and the strategic interaction between heterogeneous microfinance institutions. Length: 23 pages Creation-Date: 2008-12 Revision-Date: Publication-Status: File-URL: http://home.fau.edu/vantasse/web/MDDec11.pdf File-Format: Application/pdf File-Function: First version, 2008 Number: 08003 Classification-JEL: O12, O16, G21 Keywords: microfinance; mission drift; poverty Handle: RePEc:fal:wpaper:08003 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Geir B. Asheim Author-X-Name-First: Geir B. Author-X-Name-Last: Asheim Author-Email: g.b.asheim@econ.uio.no Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, Norway Author-Name: Claude d’Aspremont Author-X-Name-First: Claude Author-X-Name-Last: d’Aspremont Author-Email: daspremont@core.ucl.ac.be Author-Workplace-Name: CORE, Universit´e catholique de Louvain, Belgium Author-Name: Kuntal Banerjee Author-X-Name-First: Kuntal Author-X-Name-Last: Banerjee Author-Email: kbanerje@fau.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University Title: Generalized time-invariant overtaking Abstract: We present a new version of the overtaking criterion, which we call generalized time-invariant overtaking. The generalized time-invariant overtaking criterion (on the space of infinite utility streams) is defined by extending proliferating sequences of complete and transitive binary relations defined on finite dimensional spaces. The paper presents a general approach that can be specialized to at least two, extensively researched examples, the utilitarian and the leximin orderings on a finite dimensional Euclidean space. Length: 33 pages Creation-Date: 2008-10 Revision-Date: Publication-Status: File-URL: http://kuntal.banerjee.googlepages.com/overta03.pdf File-Format: Application/pdf File-Function: First version, 2008 Number: 08004 Classification-JEL: D63, D71 Keywords: Intergenerational justice; Utilitarianism; Leximin Handle: RePEc:fal:wpaper:08004