Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Lara Bryant Author-X-Name-First: Lara Author-X-Name-Last: Bryant Author-Email: lbryant@fau.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University Author-Name: Sharmila Vishwasrao Author-X-Name-First: Sharmila Author-X-Name-Last: Vishwasrao Author-Email: svishwas@fau.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University Title: Physician Quality and Health Care for the Poor and Uninsured Abstract: Many studies have documented adverse health outcomes for uninsured patients in U.S. hospitals. These poor outcomes have been attributed to their health status and limited access to healthcare. A measure of treatment that remains unexplored is the quality of the physicians treating uninsured patients. We examine whether uninsured and poor patients are treated by lower quality physicians with four measures of physician quality. Using a hospital fixed-effects model, we find that cardiac patients are matched to physician quality based on their ability to pay. Even after controlling for average physician quality within a hospital and patient characteristics, we find that uninsured and Medicaid patients are generally treated by lower quality physicians. We also find that while for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals treat the uninsured with lower quality physicians, government hospitals do not. However, there is evidence that hospitals of all ownership types treat Medicaid patients with lower quality physicians. Length: 31 pages Creation-Date: 2006-07 Revision-Date: Publication-Status: File-URL: http://home.fau.edu/svishwas/web/Physician%20Quality%20and%20Outcomes2.pdf File-Format: Application/pdf File-Function: Revised version, 2007 Number: 06001 Classification-JEL: I11, I18, J18 Keywords: Uninsured, Medicaid, Physician Quality, Hospital Ownership Handle: RePEc:fal:wpaper:06001 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Eric Van Tassel Author-X-Name-First: Eric Author-X-Name-Last: Van Tassel Author-Email: vantasse@fau.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University Author-Name: Sharmila Vishwasrao Author-X-Name-First: Sharmila Author-X-Name-Last: Vishwasrao Author-Email: svishwas@fau.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University Title: Asymmetric Information and the Mode of Entry In Foreign Credit Markets Abstract: In a newly liberalized credit market, foreign banks with cost advantages are likely to be less informed than domestic banks that hold information on credit risks. These relative advantages may generate incentives for a foreign bank to negotiate acquisition of a domestic bank in order to capture information endowments. However, if it is difficult to assess the value of information held by banks, the foreign bank will face important choices about the optimal mode of entry and what acquisition price to pay. These choices have implications for the survival of domestic banks and how capital is allocated after liberalization. Length: 35 pages Creation-Date: 2006-08 Revision-Date: Publication-Status: forthcoming in Journal of Banking and Finance File-URL: http://home.fau.edu/svishwas/web/Mode%20of%20bank%20entry.pdf File-Format: Application/pdf File-Function: First version, 2006 Number: 06002 Classification-JEL: G21, D82 Keywords: Foreign entry, bank competition, information Handle: RePEc:fal:wpaper:06002 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Nejat Anbarci Author-X-Name-First: Nejat Author-X-Name-Last: Anbarci Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Florida International University Author-Name: Monica Escaleras Author-X-Name-First: Monica Author-X-Name-Last: Escaleras Author-Email: mescaler@fau.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Florida Atlantic University Author-Name: Charles Register Author-X-Name-First: Charles Author-X-Name-Last: Register Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Florida Atlantic University Title: Collective (In)Action and Corruption: Access to Improved Water and Sanitation Abstract: A country’s levels of collective action in the provision of socially desirable goods and services are primarily determined by its level of development, important natural attributes, and its unique institutional characteristics. In general, one can expect that, given a particular set of natural attributes and institutions, the greater a county’s per capita GDP, the more extensive will be its commitment to the provision of goods and services that require collective action. The primary contention of this paper is that one of the most important aspects of institutions that affect socially desirable collective action is the extent of public sector corruption. More specifically, we first develop a theoretical model which explicitly shows the relations between per capita GDP, corruption, and collective action in the form of the provision of improved drinking water and appropriate sanitation facilities. We test our model by analyzing a sample of 77 countries, annually, between 1982 and 2001, for a total sample of 1,519 observations. Relying on a two-way fixed effects estimation strategy, we find that corruption does in fact lead to lower levels of both access to improved drinking water and appropriate sanitation than a given country’s level of per capita GDP and other institutions alone would predict. Length: 24 pages Creation-Date: 2006-01 Revision-Date: Publication-Status: File-URL: http://home.fau.edu/mescaler/web/working%20papers/sanitation.pdf File-Format: Application/pdf File-Function: First version, 2006 Number: 06003 Classification-JEL: D31, H41, P16 Keywords: Collective Action, corruption, institutional variables Handle: RePEc:fal:wpaper:06003 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Nejat Anbarci Author-X-Name-First: Nejat Author-X-Name-Last: Anbarci Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Florida International University Author-Name: Monica Escaleras Author-X-Name-First: Monica Author-X-Name-Last: Escaleras Author-Email: mescaler@fau.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Florida Atlantic University Author-Name: Charles Register Author-X-Name-First: Charles Author-X-Name-Last: Register Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Florida Atlantic University Title: Traffic Fatalities and Public Sector Corruption Abstract: Traffic accidents result in 1 million deaths annually worldwide, though the burden is disproportionately felt in poorer countries. Typically, fatality rates from disease and accidents fall as countries develop. Traffic deaths, however, regularly increase with income, at least up to a threshold level, before declining. While we confirm this by analyzing 1,356 country-year observations between 1982 and 2000, our purpose is to consider the role played by public sector corruption in determining traffic fatalities. We find that such corruption, independent of income, plays a significant role in the epidemics of traffic fatalities that are common in relatively poor countries. Length: 18 pages Creation-Date: 2006-01 Revision-Date: 2006-07 Publication-Status: Published in Kyklos, Volume 56, Issue 3, pages 327-344. File-URL: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/118560996/abstract File-Format: Application/pdf File-Function: Published version, 2006 Number: 06004 Classification-JEL: O57, I32, H41 Keywords: Traffic fatalities, corruption, vulnerable users Handle: RePEc:fal:wpaper:06004 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Monica Escaleras Author-X-Name-First: Monica Author-X-Name-Last: Escaleras Author-Email: mescaler@fau.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Florida Atlantic University Author-Name: Nejat Anbarci Author-X-Name-First: Nejat Author-X-Name-Last: Anbarci Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Florida International University Author-Name: Charles Register Author-X-Name-First: Charles Author-X-Name-Last: Register Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Florida Atlantic University Title: Public Sector Corruption and Natural Disasters: A Potentially Deadly Interaction Abstract: A number of recent studies have, separately, addressed the effects of public sector corruption and natural disasters. In this paper, we intersect these lines of research to assess whether corruption in the public sector plays a role in the havoc wrought by large scale natural disasters, using major earthquakes as the example. We first develop a brief theoretical model of the relation between these two variables and then empirically test the proposition by analyzing 344 major quakes occurring in 42 countries during the 1975 through 2003 period. We use a Negative Binomial estimation strategy that takes into account the endogenous nature of corruption and controls for a number of other factors such as earthquake frequency, magnitude, distance from population centers, and a country’s level of development which have been shown to influence a quake’s destructiveness. The results provide strong evidence that public sector corruption is both positively and significantly related to the death toll a given earthquake takes on a population. Length: 42 pages Creation-Date: 2006-04 Revision-Date: 2006-08 Publication-Status: File-URL: http://home.fau.edu/mescaler/web/working%20papers/quakecor8.30.06.pdf File-Format: Application/pdf File-Function: Revised version, 2006 Number: 06005 Classification-JEL: D31, H41, P16 Keywords: Earthquake fatalities, corruption, institutional variables Handle: RePEc:fal:wpaper:06005 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Peter Calcagno Author-X-Name-First: Peter Author-X-Name-Last: Calcagno Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, College of Charleston Author-Name: Monica Escaleras Author-X-Name-First: Monica Author-X-Name-Last: Escaleras Author-Email: mescaler@fau.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Florida Atlantic University Title: Party Alternation, Divided Government, and Fiscal Performance within U.S. States Abstract: The literature on U.S. state government fiscal performance has examined the role of institutional factors such as budget rules and divided government, but has largely ignored the impact of party alternation. This paper primarily focuses on whether party alternation in the governor’s office affects fiscal performance. Our hypothesis is that frequent party changes create a political environment that impacts fiscal performance. To further assess the impact of party alternation on fiscal performance, we consider our primary hypothesis in conjunction with the degree of division that exists between the governor’s office and the legislature. Using panel data from 37 states between 1971 and 2000 we test the hypothesis that frequent party alternation can be expected to affect fiscal performance and find strong support for the hypothesis. Length: 18 pages Creation-Date: 2006-01 Revision-Date: 2006-12 Publication-Status: forthcoming in Economics of Governance File-URL: http://www.springerlink.com/content/bx333020027qlq47/ File-Format: Application/pdf File-Function: Published version, 2007 Number: 06006 Classification-JEL: D72, H72 Keywords: Fiscal performance, state government, party alternation Handle: RePEc:fal:wpaper:06006 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Suman Ghosh Author-X-Name-First: Suman Author-X-Name-Last: Ghosh Author-Email: sghosh@fau.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University Author-Name: Michael Waldman Author-X-Name-First: Michael Waldman Author-X-Name-Last: Waldman Author-Email: mw46@cornell.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University Title: Standard Promotion Practices Versus Up-Or-Out Contracts Abstract: In most firms a worker in any period is either promoted, left in the same job, or fired (demotions are typically rare), and there is no specific date by which a promotion needs to occur. In other employment situations, however, up-or-out contracts are common, i.e., if a worker is not promoted by a certain date the worker must leave the firm. This paper develops a theory that explains why and when each of these practices is employed. Our theory is based on asymmetric learning in labor markets and incentives associated with the prospect of future promotion. Our main result is that firms employ up-orout contracts when firm-specific human capital is low while they employ standard promotion practices when it is high. We also find that, if firms can commit to a wage floor for promoted workers and effort provision is important, then up-or-out contracts are employed when low-level and high-level jobs are similar. We believe these results are of interest because they are consistent with many of the settings in which up-or-out is typically observed such as law firms and academic institutions. Length: 43 pages Creation-Date: 2006-07 Revision-Date: Publication-Status: File-URL: http://home.fau.edu/sghosh/web/SGW(July2006).pdf File-Format: Application/pdf File-Function: First version, 2006 Number: 06007 Classification-JEL: Keywords: Handle: RePEc:fal:wpaper:06007 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Vadym Volosovych Author-X-Name-First: Vadym Author-X-Name-Last: volosovych Author-Email: vvolosov@fau.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University Title: Risk Sharing from International Factor Income: Explaining Cross-Country Differences Abstract: Access to world capital markets and net investment income flows between countries help protect national income from country-specific output shocks. I empirically study what factors explain cross-country differences in the extent of risk sharing from international factor income. An index of investor protection is the leading causal variable for the estimated amount of risk sharing over the 1985–2004 period. Improving investor protection in Russia to Denmark’s level implies five times larger risk sharing compared to the sample average. These results indicate one possible way to reap large potential benefits from international risk sharing. Length: 46 pages Creation-Date: 2006-04 Revision-Date: 2009-01 Publication-Status: File-URL: http://home.fau.edu/vvolosov/web/FI_20090108.pdf File-Format: Application/pdf File-Function: Revised version, 2009 Number: 06008 Classification-JEL: F36, G15, O17 Keywords: Financial markets integration, income insurance, risk sharing, investor protection Handle: RePEc:fal:wpaper:06008 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Yuliya Demyanyk Author-X-Name-First: Yuliya Author-X-Name-Last: Demyanyk Author-Email: Yuliya.Demyanyk@stls.frb.org Author-Workplace-Name: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Author-Name: Vadym Volosovych Author-X-Name-First: Vadym Author-X-Name-Last: Volosovych Author-Email: vvolosov@fau.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University Title: Gains from Financial Integration in the European Union: Evidence for New and Old Members Abstract: We estimate potential welfare gains from financial integration and corresponding better insurance against country-specific shocks to output (risk sharing) for the twenty-five European Union countries. Using theoretical utility-based measures we express the gains from risk sharing as the utility equivalent of a permanent increase in consumption. We report positive potential welfare gains for all the EU countries if they move toward full risk sharing. Ten country-members who joined the Union in 2004 have more volatile or counter-cyclical consumption and output and would obtain much higher potential gains than the longer-standing fifteen members. Length: 28 pages Creation-Date: 2006-12 Revision-Date: 2007-08 Publication-Status: File-URL: http://home.fau.edu/vvolosov/web/DV_EU_20Feb2008JIMFproofed.pdf File-Format: Application/pdf File-Function: Revised version, 2007 Number: 06009 Classification-JEL: F15, F36, E32 Keywords: EU enlargement, financial integration, welfare gains, risk sharing Handle: RePEc:fal:wpaper:06009 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Ruhai Wu Author-X-Name-First: Ruhai Author-X-Name-Last: Wu Author-Email: rwu1@fau.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University Author-Name: Xianjun Geng Author-X-Name-First: Xianjun Author-X-Name-Last: Geng Author-Email: gengxj@u.washington.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Information Systems and Operations Management, University of Washington Business School Author-Name: Andrew B. Whinston Author-X-Name-First: Andrew B. Author-X-Name-Last: Whinston Author-Email: abw@uts.cc.utexas.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Information, Risk, and Operations Management, McCombs School of Business, University of Texas, Austin Title: Rationing-Based Price Discrimination Abstract: This paper provides a theory of rationing where rationing functions as an effective mechanism for second degree price discrimination by a monopoly seller. When a seller charges multiple prices on homogenous products to all consumers, supply at the lowest price is limited and rationed among consumers. The supply shortage differentiates products sold at the lowest price and those sold at a higher price. When high-valuation consumers identify themselves at the higher price, the seller may extract more consumer surplus and increase his profit. In the paper, we address two common rationing-based price discrimination strategies, multiple-price menu and premium advance selling.. We also show that rationing-based price discrimination can be combined with other classical price discrimination strategies to further increase the seller’s profit. Length: 41 pages Creation-Date: 2006-12 Revision-Date: Publication-Status: File-URL: http://home.fau.edu:8080/rwu1/web/Rationing%20Based%20Price%20Discrimination.pdf File-Format: Application/pdf File-Function: First version, 2006 Number: 06010 Classification-JEL: D42, L12 Keywords: rationing, price discrimination Handle: RePEc:fal:wpaper:06010