Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Vadym Volosovych Author-X-Name-First: Vadym Author-X-Name-Last: volosovych Author-Email: vvolosov@fau.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University Title: Financial Market Integration Over the Long Run: Is there a U-shape? Abstract: I show that the principal components analysis can be used to quantify the degree of economic integration, trace its evolution over time, and capture episodes of market segmentation. Based on long series of sovereign bond data for fifteen industrialized economies I document clear evidence of higher financial markets integration at the end of the 20th century compared to the earlier periods (J -shaped trend with a trough as early as the 1920s). Countries’ sovereign bond markets were much more segmented prior to World War I than in the following periods. Length: 38 pages Creation-Date: 2005-07 Revision-Date: 2007-02 Publication-Status: File-URL: http://www.fau.edu/~vvolosov/Research/Volosovych_U-shape_20070130.pdf File-Format: Application/pdf File-Function: New version, 2007 Number: 05001 Classification-JEL: F02, F33, F36, G15, N2 Keywords: financial markets integration, principal components, sovereign bonds Handle: RePEc:fal:wpaper:05001 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Nejat Anbarci Author-X-Name-First: Nejat Author-X-Name-Last: Anbarci Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Florida International University Author-Name: Monica Escaleras Author-X-Name-First: Monica Author-X-Name-Last: Escaleras Author-Email: mescaler@fau.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Florida Atlantic University Author-Name: Charles Register Author-X-Name-First: Charles Author-X-Name-Last: Register Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Florida Atlantic University Title: Income, Income Inequality and the “Hidden Epidemic” of Traffic Fatalities Abstract: Few, if any, epidemics responsible for 20 million severe injuries and/or deaths each year, globally, receive less public attention than do traffic accidents truly making them a “hidden epidemic”. Worse yet, the epidemic is growing as evidenced by World Health Organization data which show deaths from traffic accidents increasing by 20 percent between 1990 and 2002. In this paper we examine how a country’s stage of development and its distribution of income affect its traffic fatality rate. In our theoretical analysis, we show that traffic fatalities should have a nonlinear relationship with a country’s level of per capita income while being a decreasing function of income equality. We test our model’s predictions by evaluating data from 79 countries between 1970 and 2000, taking into account other factors that influence traffic fatalities like the motorization rate, health care networks, education, and alcohol consumption and find strong evidence of the theoretical model’s predictions. Specifically, the empirical results indicate that traffic fatalities are negatively related to income equality throughout its range and also are negatively related to per capita income, above a threshold of about $11,500. Length: 43 pages Creation-Date: 2005-11 Revision-Date: 2006-08 Publication-Status: File-URL: http://home.fau.edu/mescaler/web/working%20papers/traffic-8.8.06.pdf File-Format: Application/pdf File-Function: Revised version, 2006 Number: 05002 Classification-JEL: O57, I32 Keywords: Vulnerable road users, traffic safety interventions, per capita income, income inequality Handle: RePEc:fal:wpaper:05002 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Nejat Anbarci Author-X-Name-First: Nejat Author-X-Name-Last: Anbarci Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Florida International University Author-Name: Monica Escaleras Author-X-Name-First: Monica Author-X-Name-Last: Escaleras Author-Email: mescaler@fau.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Florida Atlantic University Author-Name: Charles Register Author-X-Name-First: Charles Author-X-Name-Last: Register Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Florida Atlantic University Title: From Cholera Outbreaks to Pandemics: The Role of Poverty and Inequality Abstract: Cholera and other diarrheal diseases are the second leading cause of death among the poor globally. The tragedy of this statistic is that it need not be the case. Unlike many afflictions, the impact of cholera can be greatly reduced, if not eliminated, through the collective action of clean water services. This begs the question of why such collective action is absent in much of the world. To address this, we first develop a theoretical model which indicates that the required collective action is an increasing function of both a country’s level of income and income equality. We test these predictions by analyzing 1,032 annual observations arising from 17 relatively poor countries between the years 1980 and 2002. The countries come from the Americas, Africa, and Asia. In the first part of the analysis, we find that the collective action of providing clean water is, as predicted, an increasing function of income and equality. Following this, we find that both the numbers of cases and deaths resulting from a given cholera outbreak are strongly and negatively related to the collective action. Length: 41 pages Creation-Date: 2005-08 Revision-Date: 2006-02 Publication-Status: File-URL: http://home.fau.edu/mescaler/web/working%20papers/Cholera.pdf File-Format: Application/pdf File-Function: Revised version, 2006 Number: 05003 Classification-JEL: D31, H41, I10 Keywords: Cholera, diarrheal diseases, pandemics, per capita income, inequality Handle: RePEc:fal:wpaper:05003 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Suman Ghosh Author-X-Name-First: Suman Author-X-Name-Last: Ghosh Author-Email: sghosh@fau.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University Author-Name: Alexander Karaivanov Author-X-Name-First: Alexander Author-X-Name-Last: Karaivanov Author-Email: akaraiva@sfu.ca Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University Title: Can a raise in your wage make you worse off? A public goods perspective Abstract: We show that a seemingly paradoxical result is possible—an increase in one's wage can reduce one's welfare. Such outcome can occur in an economy populated by agents who value a private good bought using labor income and a public good produced by voluntary time contributions. A raise in the wage (in general, opportunity cost of time) makes each agent substitute away from contributing to the public good, failing to internalize the negative externality imposed on others. The result is a decrease in public good provision. Under quite general conditions, the implied cumulative negative effect on agents' welfare can more than offset the positive effect of the wage raise from increased private good consumption and lead to an equilibrium in which all agents are worse off. Our result is particularly relevant for developing economy settings as it holds for relatively low initial wage levels. We discuss the applicability of our findings to a number of important problems in development, such as market integration, cooperation in common pool resource conservation and social capital. Length: 21 pages Creation-Date: 2005-01 Revision-Date: 2006-03 Publication-Status: Forthcoming in Journal of Development Economics File-URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6VBV-4JW7X23-2&_user=2139755&_handle=V-WA-A-W-ZW-MsSAYVW-UUA-U-AAZDYYYECC-AAZCVZEDCC-AWVEYYZAV-ZW-U&_fmt=summary&_coverDate=05%2F04%2F2006&_rdoc=51&_orig=browse&_srch=%23toc%235936%239999%23999999999%2399999!&_cdi=5936&view=c&_acct=C000054269&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=2139755&md5=1fd72b7ba0146e337cafd051ce78eb88#cor1 File-Format: Application/pdf File-Function: Revised version, 2006 Number: 05004 Classification-JEL: O12, D62, H41 Keywords: Private provision of public good, Economic development, Externalities Handle: RePEc:fal:wpaper:05004 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Suman Ghosh Author-X-Name-First: Suman Author-X-Name-Last: Ghosh Author-Email: sghosh@fau.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University Author-Name: Alexander Karaivanov Author-X-Name-First: Alexander Author-X-Name-Last: Karaivanov Author-Email: akaraiva@sfu.ca Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University Author-Name: Mandar Oak Author-X-Name-First: Mandar Author-X-Name-Last: Oak Author-Email: mandar.oak@williams.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Williams College Title: A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions? Abstract: We extend the model of voluntary contributions to multiple public goods by allowing for bundling of the public goods. Specifically, we study the case where agents contribute into a common pool which is then allocated towards the financing of two pure public goods. We explore the welfare implications of allowing for such bundling vis-a-vis a separate contributions scheme. We show that when agents have homogeneous preferences, they cannot be made better off with a bundling scheme. On the contrary, in the generic case when agents are heterogenous in their incomes and preferences, bundling may increase joint welfare compared to a separate contribution scheme, in particular for higher income inequality among the agents. It is interesting to note that the welfare improvement occurs despite a decrease in total contributions. Our findings have implications for the design of charitable institutions and international aid agencies. Length: 24 pages Creation-Date: 2005-06 Revision-Date: Publication-Status: File-URL: http://home.fau.edu/sghosh/web/gkopaper2.pdf File-Format: Application/pdf File-Function: First version, 2005 Number: 05005 Classification-JEL: H41, D61 Keywords: Private provision, Public goods, Bundling Handle: RePEc:fal:wpaper:05005 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Kameshwari Shankar Author-X-Name-First: Kameshwari Author-X-Name-Last: Shankar Author-Email: kameshwari.shankar@gmail.com Author-Workplace-Name: Charles River Associates, Boston, MA Author-Name: Suman Ghosh Author-X-Name-First: Suman Author-X-Name-Last: Ghosh Author-Email: sghosh@fau.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University Title: Favorable Selection in the Labor Market: A Theory of Worker Mobility in R&D Intensive Industries Abstract: This paper builds a theoretical model to address evidence on labor mobility patterns in technology-intensive firms engaged in R&D. Labor turnover in these firms is characteristically different from turnover in traditional industries both in size and composition. Specifically, the pool of workers switching employers comprises of relatively productive workers. Our model focuses on distinguishing features of R&D-intensive firms, in particular, the stochastic nature of returns to R&D investment and the transmission of knowledge spillovers through worker movement, to explain patterns of labor mobility in these firms. The analysis also serves as a tool to analyze the role of Non Disclosure Agreements in wage contracts. Length: 38 pages Creation-Date: 2005-12 Revision-Date: Publication-Status: File-URL: http://home.fau.edu/sghosh/web/Shankar-Ghosh.pdf File-Format: Application/pdf File-Function: First version, 2005 Number: 05006 Classification-JEL: Keywords: Handle: RePEc:fal:wpaper:05006